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a b s t r a c t
We employ a stochastic dynamic programming approach to study decision making by an
individual wishing to have an arranged marriage. First, we show that this individual never
opts out of a voluntarily agreed uponmarriage. Second, we demonstrate that our marrying
individual uses a reservation utility to determine which marriage proposal to accept.
Third, we compute the expected length of time during which our marrying individual
stays single. Finally, we focus on an arranged marriage market in which there are many
identical marrying individuals and profit maximizing matchmaking firms. We show that
profit maximization implies that all matchmaking firms offer marriage proposals whose
utility equals the reservation utility of our marrying individuals.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In ‘‘love marriages’’, men and women who wish to get married search for a bride/groom and this activity is generally
conducted by the two individuals who are interested in gettingmarried. In contrast, in ‘‘arrangedmarriages’’, the individuals
who wish to get married typically do not conduct any search activities by themselves. Instead, the process of searching for a
suitable bride or groom is conducted by parents, family, and, in recent times, increasingly by matchmaking firms. As noted
by Batabyal [1], it is a routine in many contemporary arranged marriages for the well-wishers of a marrying individual to
bring appropriate marriage proposals to this individual for his or her approval. If a specific marriage proposal is approved
then the search process concludes. If the proposal is not approved, then the search process continues.
Arranged marriages have been studied by researchers in several disciplines. Examining arranged marriages within the
Tamil Brahmin diaspora, Kalpagam [2] notes that the matrimonial strategies employed and accepted by all the pertinent
parties still reflect deep gender asymmetries. Lu [3] analyzes the activities of matchmakers in arrangedmarriages in Taiwan
and points out that these activities go beyondmere commercial activities and involve other types of social relations that are
sustained throughout amarriage.Wolf andGates [4] focus on Taipei, Taiwan and notice that the differentialmarriage rates of
urban and ruralwomen can be explained by the greater demand for female labor in the city and not by the increased freedom
of women to refuse marriages arranged by their parents. Banerjee et al. [5] point out that because both sides to an arranged
marriage have a strong preference for a ‘‘within caste’’ marriage and because these two sides are fairly homogeneous in
terms of the distribution of other attributes, caste remains a persistent feature in the Indian arranged marriage market.
Although the papers discussed in the previous paragraph have advanced our understanding of arranged marriages,
they have shed little light on the theoretical aspects of decision making in arranged marriages. Recently, a small literature
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has begun to formally analyze decision making in arranged marriages. Using the so called ‘‘one-stage-look-ahead-policy’’,
Batabyal [6] shows that a marrying individual’s optimal decision rule depends only on the nature of the current marriage
proposal, independent of whether there is recall of previous proposals. Batabyal [7] analyzes decision making in arranged
marriageswith an age constraint anddemonstrates that it is optimal towait awhile before saying yes to a particularmarriage
proposal. Vaillant andHarrant [8] have used the theoretical framework in Batabyal [7] to empirically study the functioning of
a French matchmaking agency. Batabyal and DeAngelo [9] study arranged marriages from the perspective of a matchmaker
and provide conditions under which it is optimal for this matchmaker to either accept or reject individual matching
assignments. We continue this theoretical investigation of arranged marriages begun by the researchers mentioned above.
Specifically, we use a stochastic dynamic programming approach adapted from [10] to analyze aspects of decisionmaking in
arranged marriages that have been insufficiently studied in the literature. Our approach can also be thought of as a ‘‘search-
theoretic approach’’. First,we use our theoretical framework to show that an individualwishing to have an arrangedmarriage
never opts out of a marriage that he has voluntarily entered into. Second, we demonstrate that our marrying individual uses
the notion of a reservation utility to determine which marriage proposal to accept. Third, we compute the expected length
of time during which our marrying individual stays single (unmarried). Finally, we focus on an arranged marriagemarket in
which there are many identical marrying individuals on the demand side and profit maximizing matchmaking firms on the
supply side. We show that profit maximization implies that all matchmaking firms offer marriage proposals whose utility
equals the reservation utility of our marrying individuals.1
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the theoretical framework. Section 3 studies the use
of the concept of a reservation utility by our marrying individual to determine which marriage proposal he ought to accept.
Section 4 calculates the mean length of time during which our marrying individual is single. Section 5 first focuses on an
arranged marriage market and then demonstrates a logical implication of profit maximization by the matchmaking firms
under study. Section 6 concludes and suggests ways in which the research in this paper might be extended.
2. The theoretical framework
Consider an individual who wishes to have an arranged marriage and who has a utility function defined over the quality
of marriage proposals. This individual can be male or female. However, in most arranged marriage settings, males tend
to have more bargaining power than females. As a result of the investigative activities of this individual’s family, friends,
and matchmakers, marriage proposals of uncertain quality are brought to our marrying individual. The qualities of these
marriage proposals are random variables whose domain is a closed interval in the set of non-negative real numbers. Because
our marrying individual’s utility function maps stochastic proposal quality to utility, the utilities generated by the marriage
proposals of uncertain quality are themselves random variableswith domain [0, uˆ]. Denote the distribution function of these
utilities by H(u). Let β be the time invariant discount factor; this invariance is needed for the validity of our subsequent
mathematical analysis. Time is discrete. From the standpoint of our marrying individual, H(u) is an exogenously given
stationary distribution of utilities. The reader may want to think of our marring individual as someone who ‘‘samples’’
utilities from the H(u) distribution. This marrying individual’s aim is to maximize the net present discounted value of his
utility stream. Once ourmarrying individual accepts a specific utility, i.e., once he accepts amarriage proposal of a particular
quality, he can stay married to the person behind this marriage proposal for an indefinitely long period of time.
Our task now is to formulate our marrying individual’s intertemporal maximization problem. We do so recursively with
the maintained assumption that once our marrying individual finds a marriage partner and gets married, he never leaves
his partner. Using stochastic dynamic programming (see [13] and, for a more recent exposition, [14]), the recursive problem
of our marrying individual who currently has utility u can be written as
V (u) = max

u/(1− β), β
∫ uˆ
0
V (u˜)dH(u˜)

, (1)
where V (·) is the value function. Eq. (1) is sometimes referred to as the optimality equation.We now show that ourmarrying
individual never opts out of a marriage that he has voluntarily entered into.
3. Never leave an acceptable marriage partner
Mathematically, demonstrating the above involves showing that once our marrying individual accepts a proposal with
a particular utility and gets married, he never leaves the person behind this particular utility. Notice that if our marrying
individual accepts a marriage proposal with utility u at time t, then we must have
u/(1− β) ≥ β
∫ uˆ
0
V (u˜)dH(u˜). (2)
1 There exists a small literature on stable matching and the marriage problem. See [11,12] for additional details on this literature.
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At time t + 1, our marrying individual has the same utility he had at time t and he faces the same expected value in case
he decides to leave his marriage partner. In other words, he faces essentially the same tradeoff as the one he faced at time
t . This tells us that our marrying individual who accepts a utility (marriage partner) at time t does not dispense with this
utility or leave his marriage partner at time t + 1. It follows by mathematical induction that our marrying individual will
continue to stay married to the partner he said yes to at time t and he will not leave this partner and go back to ‘‘sampling’’
utilities from the distribution function H(u). Our next task is to establish that our marrying individual uses the notion of a
reservation utility to determine which marriage proposal to say yes to.
4. The reservation utility
Using standard arguments from stochastic dynamic programming (see [14], pp. 537–565), it can be shown that the value
function V (·) takes a piecewise linear form and that this function is linear and strictly increasing after a flat portion. From
these two pieces of information, we can deduce that our marrying individual’s optimal policy takes the form of a threshold
rule in the sense that there exists a threshold or reservation utility level U∗ with the property that our marrying individual
accepts all marriage proposals with utility above U∗ and he rejects all proposals with utility less than U∗ and continues
to ‘‘sample’’ utilities from the distribution function H(u). This line of reasoning and some thought together tell us that the
reservation utility U∗ is the unique solution to the equation
U∗ = {β/(1− β)}
∫ uˆ
U∗
(u− U∗)dH(u). (3)
Intuitively, the reservation utility on the left-hand-side (LHS) of (3) is our marrying individual’s immediate gain from
accepting a marriage proposal and then getting married. This individual trades off this gain with the option value of waiting
for a marriage proposal of higher utility. This option value is given by the right-hand-side (RHS) of (3).
Notice that by rejecting the current marriage proposal that is offered to our marrying individual, this individual can
potentially expect to receive a marriage proposal with higher utility in the next time period and thereby earn u− U∗ more
utility than the currentmarriage proposal that is offered to him. The β term in front of the expression on the RHS of (3) takes
into account the time cost of waiting for a new marriage proposal. Similarly, the 1/(1 − β) ratio in front of the expression
on the RHS of (3) takes into account the fact that a superior marriage proposal in the next time period will result in higher
utility to ourmarrying individual in all subsequent time periods. This completes our discussion of the notion of a reservation
utility that, as we have just seen, is basic to our marrying individual’s decision making. We now compute the mean length
of time during which our marrying individual stays single or unmarried.
5. The expected duration of bachelorhood
From the analysis in Sections 3 and 4, it is clear that ourmarrying individualwill be single or unmarried until he receives a
marriage proposal whose utility exceeds the reservation utilityU∗. To this end, let tU∗ be the random variable which denotes
the first time period in which our marrying individual receives a marriage proposal whose utility is at least as great as U∗.
Also, let p(t) denote the probability that tU∗ = t for t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
Now, we can infer that p(t) = H(U∗)t{1− H(U∗)} and that the expected duration of the bachelorhood we seek, is given
by
E[tU∗ ] =
∞−
t=0
tp(t) = {1− H(U∗)}
∞−
t=0
tH(U∗)t , (4)
where E[·] is the expectation operator. Notice that the expression on the RHS of (4) involving the distribution function and
the summation term can be simplified further. After some algebra, this RHS expression simplifies to H(U∗)/{1 − H(U∗)}
and hence, we can write
E[tU∗ ] = H(U∗)/{1− H(U∗)}. (5)
Because the distribution functionH(U∗) is increasing in the reservation utilityU∗, it is clear that the expected duration of our
marrying individual’s bachelorhood is increasing in the threshold level of utility at which he chooses to say yes to amarriage
proposal (get married). We now proceed to our final task in this paper. This involves analyzing an arrangedmarriagemarket
in which there are many identical marrying individuals on the demand side and profit maximizing matchmaking firms on
the supply side. Specifically, we want to show that profit maximization implies that all the matchmaking firms will offer
marriage proposals whose utility is equal to the reservation utility of our marrying individuals.
6. Marriage proposals offered by matchmaking firms
Suppose that the marriage proposals of varying levels of utility in the distribution H(u) are not the result of the
investigative activities of family and friends but, instead, are offered by matchmaking firms. Further, in the remainder of
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this section, all marrying individuals are identical. Now, consider the case of a matchmaking firm that offers a marriage
proposal whose utility u strictly exceeds the reservation utility U∗. The cost of offering this marriage proposal is also u
to this matchmaking firm. Clearly, any marrying individual who receives the above offer will say yes to the offer and get
married. Suppose instead that thismatchmaking firm offers amarriage proposal whose utility is u−ϵ > U∗ for a sufficiently
small ϵ > 0. In this case, every marrying individual will continue to accept this marriage offer but the matchmaking firm
will have reduced its cost by ϵ in every time period. This tells us that offering marriage proposals whose utility u > U∗
cannot be optimal.
Now consider a matchmaking firm that offers marriage proposals whose utility u < U∗. In this case, the matchmaking
firm will generate no business and hence it will make zero profit. Matchmaking firms that offer marriage proposals whose
utility u ≥ U∗ will generate business and will also be making positive – or at least non-negative – profit, because, if this
were not the case then they would simply not want to generate any business. Since all the matchmaking firms are identical,
a firm that offers marriage proposals whose utility u < U∗ can increase its profits by offering marriage proposals with
utility u = U∗ and generate additional business. This line of reasoning allows us to conclude that matchmaking firms that
offer marriage proposals whose utility u ≠ U∗ are not maximizing profits. Put differently, for the model of this paper to
be consistent with profit maximization by the matchmaking firms, the distribution function H(u) should be such that all
weight is put on a single utility level, say, u∗ and all themarrying individuals ought to accept or reject marriage proposals on
offer using the reservation utility or threshold rule u∗ = U∗. This concludes our analysis of a market for arranged marriages
in which the key players are marrying individuals on the demand side and matchmaking firms on the supply side.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we used a stochastic dynamic programming approach to study the properties of decision making by an
individual who wishes to have an arranged marriage. First, we showed that this individual never opts out of a marriage that
he has voluntarily entered into. Second, we demonstrated that our marrying individual uses a threshold rule or the notion
of a reservation utility to determine whichmarriage proposal to accept. Third, we computed themean length of time during
which our marrying individual stays single. Finally, we focused on an arranged marriage market in which there are many
identical marrying individuals and profit maximizing matchmaking firms. We showed that profit maximization implied
that all the matchmaking firms offered marriage proposals whose utility equaled the reservation utility of the marrying
individuals.
Here are two suggestions for extending the analysis described in this paper. First, it would be useful to generalize the
above analysis by studying decision making when it is possible for a marrying individual to divorce a person he was once
married to. Second, it would also be instructive to examine a scenario inwhich amarrying individual’s decisionmaking does
not employ a threshold rule of the sort analyzed in this paper. Studies that analyze these aspects of the problemwill provide
further insights into the properties of decision making in a kind of marriage that is widely practiced in many parts of the
world.
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